 Ukraine's Secret Plan to Join NATO By Christina OLEARCHYK-ZALIPSKY |
A U.S. State department spokesman once said that, "Ukrainian membership in NATO is out of the question." Though that statement may have been music to the ears of Russia's leaders and eagerly welcomed by most members of the international community it has turned out to be far from the truth. Since independence, the Ukrainian government has embarked on a persistent yet cautious, evolutionary and balanced policy with regard to its eventual membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Ukraine's pursuit has been cautious in that senior officials refrained from issuing public statements during the early 1990s that would have prematurely confirmed their precise long-term objectives. The cautious element persisted for well over a decade in that officials continued to issue statements such as: "Ukraine is not yet ready to join NATO." These statements were, first and foremost, meant to keep Russia calm and at bay, and to pacify Ukraine's Russian minority as well as other national actors who opposed closer Ukraine-NATO relations. These proclamations were also issued to refrain from alarming Western leaders who shivered at the time over the thought of a cozy Kyiv-Brussels Alliance. In doing so, Ukraine has been able to acquire the breathing space it needed to prepare its political, economic, social, constitutional, military and international structures to qualify for membership.
Since achieving independence, the nation's leaders have embarked on a course of action that they believed would lead the country to a close relationship with the alliance. If the country could not attain full-fledged membership in the organization, it hoped to at least achieve de facto membership which positions Ukraine as a close, loyal and respected NATO ally. In turn, NATO would be compelled to support, assist and secure its Ukrainian ally to a given extent even though it is not a permanent member. Full-fledged membership would assure the same security guarantees accorded to other permanent members.
Given the developments of the last two years, the country may have already achieved its minimal goal of de facto membership. NATO troops regularly train in Ukraine, the country's military is an active participant in peacekeeping efforts, and the country has been heavily involved in NATO subsidiary organizations for years, most notably in the area of emergency management.
Moreover, during meetings in Kyiv last month, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said he hoped to hold a top-level Ukraine-NATO commission meeting during the alliance's Istanbul summit in July. The secretary-general also indicated that a plan approved in November 2002, aimed at building a closer relationship, has laid a foundation for developing bilateral cooperation and will help Ukraine become a NATO member.
President Leonid Kuchma noted that Ukraine welcomed NATO's eastward enlargement, saying the country would work to join the alliance soon. The president said that through participation in peacekeeping missions and other cooperation, "we want to emphasize that we intend to move seriously towards NATO."
Ukraine was the first of the 15 former Soviet republics to join NATO's Partnership for Peace program in February 1994, and it signed a special partnership charter with the military alliance in 1997 which outlined the framework of Ukrainian-NATO relations.
This article, however, does not focus so much on current developments in Ukraine's relationship with NATO, but examines how the relationship formed, and how Ukraine's leaders have carefully fostered the relationship in such a manner so as not to alarm domestic and foreign elements that would disapprove of the country's involvement in NATO.
The strategy employed by the nation's senior leadership relied on tactics initially advocated by Ukraine's nationalists. They included innocuously and persistently integrating Ukraine into pan-European and NATO-related structures, and elevating Ukraine's political, economic, legislative, social and military structures, as well as its international stature to meet the standards required for NATO membership.
The country's official NATO policy was formulated and implemented by the country's president and a small group of close advisors. Ukraine's NATO policy has been strongly affected by the content and debate over the Ukrainian national identity; the perception, self-interest and power of Ukraine's political and industrial elite; the 'Russian Factor;' and the perceptions and policies of key Western states and international institutions towards both Ukraine and Ukraine-NATO relations. From the beginning, presidents Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma manipulated these four variables to render them more conducive to Ukraine's NATO objective.
Seeds of Policy
Ukraine's foreign policy did not start "the day of the successful nationwide referendum on Dec. 1, 1991, or even the day of the declaration of independence on Aug. 24, 1991," said former Foreign Affairs Minister Borys Tarasyuk. "In reality, Ukraine's foreign policy began immediately after the adoption of state sovereignty on July 16, 1990."
Likewise, Ukraine's NATO policy did not commence on Oct. 6, 1991, the day that NATO announced that it "may expand" eastward. In reality, the seeds of Ukraine's NATO policy were sown even before Ukraine's Proclamation of Sovereignty.
The intentions and strategies underpinning Ukraine's NATO policy were implanted by Ukrainian nationalists, who resurfaced during the historic era of glasnost and perestroika in the mid-1980s. Even before the Soviet Union collapsed, Ukraine's nationalists were tilling the political soil, preparing to grow an independent Ukrainian nation. They patiently waited until the time was right, preparing for the realization of an independent Ukraine; the establishment of a strong Ukrainian state capable of cultivating and protecting the Ukrainian nation (first and foremost from Russia) and, the re-integration of Ukraine into its rightful place in the European community.
Nationalists recognized that an overtly aggressive independence campaign was not the appropriate approach; they feared for their own safety, retaliation from Moscow, and a backlash from the republic's Russo-centric population - a backlash that could have easily sparked a civil war. Nationalists had no choice but to pursue these objectives with the utmost caution. Gorbachev's policies enabled nationalists to initiate a more persistent, albeit still cautious, evolutionary and balanced approach.
Nationalists recognized that the ultimate realization of their objectives depended considerably on the attainment of popular support for their agenda. Moderate nationalists moved to advocate a contemporary, more inclusive version of the traditional Ukrainian national identity, hoping to merge traditional elements of the Ukrainian national identity with civic and universal components. Naturally, the communists condemned advocacy of a new national identity, opposing anything that threatened the predominance of the "Soviet Identity."
Among the widely publicized benefits of a Ukrainian national identity was its long-lost European heritage. Nationalists asserted that Ukraine's European roots had been severed upon absorption into the Soviet Empire, and that a history in Europe would make Ukraine more readily eligible for a future in Europe. Nationalists found it relatively easy to re-awaken the remnants of a subdued national consciousness in Western Ukraine, where indeed it did not take much to rekindle memories of a European past or raise hopes for a more prosperous European future. Southern and Eastern Ukraine required more effort, since ties to a European history in these regions were miniscule.
The nationalist strategy achieved some level of success in Eastern and Southern Ukraine, and the pledge to establish a state for all the people of Ukraine and the promise of a more prosperous future under Kyiv's rule, prompted many in Southern and Eastern Ukraine to endorse the agenda as well.
Nationalist Toehold
During Ukraine's first-ever free and multi-party parliamentary elections, the opposition was permitted to participate in formal political debate, which was broadcast live on television and radio. This was the first time that nationalists had been given access to a national audience. In March 1990, nationalists won a quarter of the seats in parliament. They also subsequently won control of oblast governments in Galicia and of city, municipal and rural councils in other regions, including the city of Kyiv, in the process commanding significant institutional resources. Nearly four months later, on July 16, 1990, parliament issued the declaration of Ukraine's sovereignty, which included a pledge that the republic would be nuclear-free.
In an effort to usurp the growing nationalist movement and reaffirm his power, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev replaced the head of Ukraine's parliament, Volodymyr Ivashko, with a stringent communist party ideologue, Leonid Kravchuk. Kravchuk's assigned mission was to sequester the national movement, discipline the unruly parliament and to inject Ukraine with a dose of Soviet Reality. But it was far too late. The nationalist forces were now more powerful, and as it happened, Kravchuk was the one injected with a dose of reality, and this injection of Ukrainian nationalism would profoundly inspire and affect him. It inspired him to push through the now historically renowned Ukrainian referendum which showed that 82 percent of the voters supported Ukraine's Declaration of Sovereignty. It affected his course of reaction/action to the events surrounding the August 1991 Soviet coup. On Aug. 24, 1991, news of rapidly unfolding events in Russia reached Kyiv and the time had come to act. Kravchuk took on a more populist political role and declared his faith in "my people and its own strength." Before evening fell, parliament approved a version of "The Act of Proclamation of the Independence of Ukraine," and Kravchuk formally declared Ukraine's independence.
The nationalists managed to achieve their objective within the window of opportunity because they adequately prepared and nurtured the groundwork for it.
Ukraine's senior leadership was quick to adopt the nationalists' approach and many of their objectives. In fact, the leadership and nationalists jointly employed the nationalist strategy in order to secure the ratification of Ukraine's declaration of independence.
The national democrats and the presidential candidates, including Kravchuk, began courting various members of the international community immediately after the August declaration of independence. They essentially began introducing the West to Ukraine and to the many benefits generated by this newly independent state. Among the projected advantages: a huge market potential of 52 million for goods and cheap labor, ample inexpensive natural resources, and a large buffer for Europe against Russia.
Romancing the West
There was considerable activity in the area of foreign relations. Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko engaged in numerous official visits to glean support for an independent Ukraine. Kravchuk proceeded to host a wave of European, American, Canadian and Asian officials. Kravchuk's meetings with several Western officials demonstrated how much work still lay ahead in altering their distorted and negative perceptions of Ukraine. Kravchuk's meeting with President George H. W. Bush proved especially disappointing, after Bush offered a separate U.S. Peace Corps program for Ukraine instead of support for independence.
Contemporary scholarship generally characterizes Ukraine-NATO relations as initially being marred by hostility, isolation, mistrust and suspicion. Some in parliament did retain an antagonistic and apprehensive stance towards the alliance during the early mid-1990s. A considerable percentage of the population shared their views, and some still do.
The senior leadership, composed of the president and a small group of advisors on the National Security and Defense Council and in the Foreign Ministry, adopted a favorable NATO policy whose long-term objective was at least de facto Ukrainian membership in NATO and, ideally, full-fledged Ukrainian membership. Ukraine's NATO policy at the outset of Kravchuk's administration was not hostile or isolationist. Rather, it was persistent yet cautious, evolutionary and balanced. The primary tactics of this strategy were the integration of Ukraine into various pan-European and NATO-related organizations; and the re-engineering of the state's political, economic, social and military edifice, as well as its international stature, to meet NATO standards.
Successful outcomes in these areas, it was argued, would bring Ukraine closer to the policy's long-term objective. Put briefly, Ukraine would then be in a better position to push and qualify for NATO membership in the future.
Whether Kravchuk's pro-NATO position emanated from sincere patriotism or from a politically and economically motivated calculation meant to secure his own power and prestige remains unclear. The point is that he pursued a pro-NATO policy that it was designed to be persistent yet cautious, evolutionary and balanced. This strategy was necessary because the alternative, a more aggressive approach, would have been fatal. Kyiv could not pursue a more open and aggressive policy. Ukraine had a great deal of ground to break first in its political, economic, legislative, social, military and international facets. Also, pro-NATO sentiments were not unanimous throughout the Ukrainian government and public, and the international community, especially the United States, saw no future for Ukraine in or near the alliance at the time. Finally, an aggressive approach would have enraged Russia, and an actual or perceived attack from a rage-driven Russia was something that Ukraine could not withstand at this time. Therefore, Ukraine's courtship of NATO had to be carried out in very cautious, evolutionary and carefully balanced manner.
If the senior leadership proclaimed that Ukraine would not align itself with the newly proposed CIS, it could not turn around and in the next breath profess an interest in NATO alignment. Kyiv had no choice for the time being but to repeatedly declare that Ukraine had no interest in the alliance. Public affirmation of neutrality and non-alignment was the optimal solution for Ukraine at the time.
To bolster Ukraine's stature, the senior leadership sought to become more actively involved with Western states, regional alliances and international organizations. In January 1992, Ukraine became a participant of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which would eventually become the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, in which Ukraine would acquire membership. Kravchuk signed the Helsinki Final Act and was preparing to partake in the first official rendezvous between NATO and an independent Ukraine. Kravchuk looked forward to this meeting and regarded it as an important victory for Ukraine, but at the same time he was nervous about receiving NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner on Ukrainian territory. Kravchuk was concerned about the Russian president's response to Ukraine hosting a top NATO official, and strove to keep it a low-key event.
Woerner invited Ukraine to join NATO's North Atlantic Cooperation Council. NACC had been established to provide a forum for constructive political dialogue and cooperation on issues including defense conversion, defense budgets, disarmament, weapons standardization, airspace coordination and NATO expansion. Kravchuk accepted the invitation, and Ukraine was admitted into the NACC in March 1992, together with several other Soviet successor states. Ukraine's entrance into the NACC constituted its first official integrative step into a NATO-related structure. In May 1992, Ukraine was admitted into the North Atlantic Assembly. The leadership intentionally allotted low publicity to these milestones. Boasting about them would have only aggravated Russia and domestic anti-NATO elements.
In May 1992, Kravchuk was received in Washington D.C. where he gave assurances that Ukraine would accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to START. The meeting was a major success for U.S.-Ukraine relations.
Kravchuk next visited NATO Headquarters in July 1992, becoming the first post-Soviet leader to visit the alliance's command center. Kravchuk used this visit to express increasing concern for the future of his country, arguing that Ukraine was being squeezed into a gray area between Russia and the CIS member states and NATO and states aspiring to join the alliance. Allowing Ukraine to descend into a state of limbo, he argued, would render the country even more vulnerable to Russia's leading aspiration - regaining control of Ukraine.
Shortly after the Brussels trip, Kravchuk hosted the commander of NATO and U.S. forces in Europe, General John Shalikashvili. During this meeting, Kravchuk reiterated the leadership's concerns over Ukraine being placed in a vulnerable and tenuous position in the face of NATO's imminent eastward expansion.
The senior leadership's persistence and lobbying efforts proved fruitful. By year's end, Kravchuk managed to integrate Ukraine into what would become one of the most successful cooperative mechanisms between Ukraine and NATO to date - Civil Emergency Planning. Ukraine first began participating in CEP cooperation activities in 1992, the first year of its independence. The primary mission of the CEP was to provide protection to a country's civilians during natural calamities, emergency situations or war. What began as low-scale, symbolic cooperation would later develop into a robust program.
The progress that had characterized Ukraine-NATO relations in 1992 came to a brief halt toward the end of the year amid growing concern over Ukraine's 'prolonged failure to ratify all of START. Diplomatic contacts continued during the lull, however, including visits by U.S. Ambassador-at-large Strobe Talbott and Defense Secretary Les Aspin, who emphasized that Ukrainian independence was in the U.S. national interest.
The resolution of Ukraine's nuclear issue under U.S. auspices elevated Ukraine's status in the international arena and allowed Kyiv to resume talks with NATO. During July 1993, a high-level Ukrainian delegation visited NATO Headquarters. The delegation reiterated Ukraine's fear of being caught between the Alliance and states which aspired to be linked with it and the security system Russia was organizing in the CIS. The timing of this visit could not have been better. Less than a week later, Russia launched one of the most aggressive acts against Ukraine's territorial integrity since the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
On July 9, 1993, Russia's Duma demanded that the Ukrainian port city of Sevastopol be granted "Russian federal status." Yeltsin condemned the act, but failed to persuade parliament to reconsider it. In an effort to test the waters of international support for Ukraine, the Ukrainian parliament presented the case to the UN Security Council. Ukraine labeled the Russian parliament's actions an "aggressive political act," and on July 20, 1993, the Security Council concurred, condemning Russia's actions and deeming them inconsistent with the UN Charter and international norms. This was an enormous victory for Ukraine. By reaffirming its commitment to the territorial integrity of Ukraine, the UN solidified Ukraine's position as an equal sovereign in the international community of states.
During a NATO summit in Brussels in January 1994, the Partnership for Peace program was unveiled and invitations approved for several members of the NACC and CSCE. U.S. President Bill Clinton delivered the invitation to Ukraine during a brief stopover in Kyiv on January 12, 1994.
Yeltsin, Clinton and Kravchuk met in Moscow on Jan. 14, 1994 to sign the Trilateral Agreement on denuclearization, which established procedures for the transfer of Ukrainian nuclear warheads to Russia.
Less than a week later, on Feb. 8, 1994, Ukraine accepted the invitation to join NATO's PfP Program. There is some speculation that Clinton had initially devised the program to be a hollow carrot - a symbolic security measure meant to appease Ukraine and other former Soviet successor states. Ukraine, however, saw it and would use it as a powerful tool to wedge open the door to possible NATO membership. Indeed, Ukraine would henceforth take part in an array of NATO-sponsored exercises, military exchanges and training programs, capitalizing on every possible opportunity offered by PfP.
As a gesture of its eagerness to cooperate and contribute to international security measures, Ukraine volunteered to deploy infantry, strategic air transport and other military equipment to Sarajevo as part of UNPROFOR. According to one source, there was a time that Ukraine had 1,200 troops stationed in the region. Noteworthy also is the fact that Ukraine served at one point as the third largest provider of strategic air transport to the United Nations.
The U.S. also honored its pledge to expand and intensify Ukraine-U.S. military cooperation. During June, Defense Minister Vitaliy Radetskyj arrived in the U.S. to discuss new agreements broadening bilateral military cooperation. This took place just before Russia was scheduled to sign the NATO PfP Framework and days before Ukraine's second presidential election.
Ukraine's NATO policy during the Kravchuk era was not hostile, isolationist or adverse, as characterized by some political analysts and scholars. Ukraine had already established a NATO policy marked with the objective of attaining at least de facto NATO membership or full-fledged NATO membership. The senior leadership adopted a strategy to obtain these objectives, entailing a persistent yet cautious, evolutionary and balanced approach. The primary tactics employed by the senior leadership involved: integrating Ukraine into key pan-European and NATO-related structures; and constructing and transforming the basic elements of the nation. This included nation-building, state-building, and institution-building; political, economic, social, legislative and military reforms; and the internal consolidation and external recognition of Ukraine's independence and sovereignty. Ukraine was forced to focus on all of these aspects, not only to prepare for future NATO membership qualification, but for its very survival as a state. Yet, the survival of the state was seen by some to be contingent on becoming a NATO ally.
Christina Olearchyk-Zalipsky is a graduate of Cornell University. She earned a master's degree in public administration from Cornell's Institute for Public Affairs. This article was based on her thesis, "Ukraine's NATO Policy 1991-2000," located in the Cornell Institute for Public Affairs library in Ithaca, New York.
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More in the section:
Carrying a Faded Banner
Read also previous issue' articles:
Are Ukraine's Political Habits Unique?
Is Ukraine's Economic Growth Speculation-led?
Ukraine is Drifting to the West - Slowly but Surely
The Unfinished Orange Revolution?
Vacuums, Reforms and the Need to Regain the Initiative
Pirates of the 21st century
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