The Ruin
Following the Russo-Polish war, the treaty of Andrusov in 1667 divided east (left) bank Ukraine from west (right) bank Ukraine. The latter half of the 17th century was a period of great instability as Russia, Poland and a divided Ukrainian people under various Cossack hetmans and pretenders jockeyed for power and influence. There was misery, deprivation and suffering for the Ukrainian people. And with that, their pride, prestige and power as a people eroded.
By 1721, Tsar Peter the Great of Muscovy, looking westward toward Europe and past the Ukrainians' European history, declared Muscovy to be Russia (Rossiya). In so doing, he claimed title to the heritage and history of all the "Russian peoples." His empire then included the East Bank and Kyiv, and his vision included all the lands and peoples of the former Kyivan Rus.
Peter and his successors followed policies designed to destroy and subjugate the Ukrainian people and their language to that of the so-called Russian peoples. Such policies continued and such history was taught during the Soviet period. Those policies and that history was so successful that even today the world knows and believes Ukraine to be a part of Russia, and the Ukrainian people little more than a Russian variant.
For Ukrainians, The Ruin resulted in a loss of statehood, a loss as great as that suffered by Kyivan Rus at the hands of the Mongols.
Splitting Ukraine
More than a year ago, I posited a future "ruin" for Ukraine (Ukraine: The Coming of the Ruin - II, July 2003), and two months later, regular Ukrainian Observer contributor Serhiy Kharchenko expanded on the theme (Ruin II is real. Is it possible to prevent it?, September 2003).
Kharchenko made me aware of the ongoing debate and study that was occurring on what was being called the Split. I had been somewhat tenuous, even timid, in my discussion of the issue. Today, on reflection and considering the events of the past 15 months, I am not so timid.
In my article, I noted:
"The Black Sea and Eastern Ukraine are far more important to Russia militarily and to its significance on the world stage than it is significant to Western Europe and the West in general as a buffer under present political circumstances."
"[W]ho doubts that the Russian mindset has trouble absorbing Ukraine as being other than Russia? This is particularly true of the Russian political and military leadership and even of the intellectual elite."
[Ukraine] "cannot be said to be overwhelmed by leaders with vision or even any in leadership with any particular concern for the common needs of the people. Who among the leadership for the past years since independence has attempted to rise above truly petty politics? Petty politics are here defined as reflecting a consistent need to 'feather one's own nest', to increase one's own power and influence and to enrich one's own pocketbook."
Important observations in the Kharchenko article:
"Unfortunately, the ruling circles of Ukraine chose the way of capitulationism in order to prevent the threat of a split of the country (Ruin II). While in Russia one emphasizes that the Russian language is an important factor in state building, Ukraine cuts down programs to develop the Ukrainian language. The spheres of functioning of the Russian language are notably expanding. This fact has given ground to Ukrainian nationalists who state that Russification is very much on the increase in Ukraine. And this is observed in the 12th year of independence. Additionally it feels more and more that Ukraine is becoming a 'hostage' to Russia's economic and political expansion."
"As power representatives admit themselves,
a 'cruel, passive society' is built in Ukraine. Here there is no nation, but population, which doesn't know what citizen self-government is, but knows very well what 'sabbath' of marginal individuals is. In such a situation, Ukrainians quite often have to apologize that they exist in this world."
Today
A year later, my crystal ball is cloudy. Through the haze and murkiness, I observe and recollect occurrences, some connected, some not.
With little debate, Russia's Black Sea Fleet continues to lease territory on Ukrainian soil. The dispute over Tuzla Island and a causeway or dike in the Kerch Strait seems to have quietly been settled.
A retiring Ukrainian political leader has expressed new views on joining the European Union and NATO. A gas pipeline reverses direction after a multinational tug-of-war. The elections have made nationalism an issue only for politicians who have been tainted by it. A consensus seems to have developed on the new Single Economic Space among some former Soviet countries, under Russia's leadership. Russia's president visits Ukraine with regularity, speaking frequently and directly concerning matters Ukrainian. Likewise, Ukraine's president is a frequently flyer on the Kyiv-Moscow route.
And this too: The coming election will apparently be a two-man race. What does this mean, and does it matter?
Does the race boil down to the Sumy faction versus the Donetsk clan, or are they all the same? Could all these self-styled freedom fighters be covertly united? Are they, in reality, a band of brothers who understand what Benjamin Franklin meant when he said, 'We must all hang together or assuredly we shall all hang separately"?
Is Russian or Ukrainian ethnicity the tie that binds, or are the real loyalties to regions, to clans, to business interests and ultimately, to money?
Though plenty of cash will likely change hands between now and the day the last ballot is counted, one wonders whether the whole thing has not been sorted out already. Can Viktor Yushchenko, the semi-populist touted as the man to beat, actually win? How to sort out, in Ukraine's foggy political environment, the stalking horse from the legitimate contender?
In the future, will Ukraine be united geographically or divided, as it was after the reign of Peter the Great and prior to WW I?
The European map has changed much of late. The Soviet Union; Yugoslavia; Czechoslovakia and a divided Germany are two decades in the past.
The European Union has grown and is evolving.
In recent history, Poland has disappeared from the map of Europe three times: Krakow has been Austrian, Warsaw was Russian. What countries hold parts of Bukovina, Bessarabia, Bohemia, Moravia, other lands and relatively recent former kingdoms? The boundaries, even the peoples sometimes are changing. Only the landscapes remain.
Should Ukraine's survival as a sovereign, independent country be of concern to the West? I certainly believe so. Are Ukrainians concerned about the issue? Not really, I think. Not in any large numbers, at least, outside of Western Ukraine.
Russia certainly is interested, even ready. It waits, reviewing its options and calculating its chances, or so I believe. Though I make no predictions of how or when, I see a Russian grab as likely.
Crimea may be the first test. Could the strategic "autonomous republic" become a breakaway republic after holding a referendum to let its people choose between Ukraine and Russia? How could the world, the United Nations, or anyone, for that matter, be so undemocratic as to object?
Later, a crisis. It may arise as a provocation with the threat of conflict, possibly with the potential for armed combat. Or it may take shape as a manufactured financial crisis that threatens large numbers of Ukrainians - or just a few wealthy and powerful ones. Or any number of other contrived scenarios may play out.
Would, could and should an independent Ukraine survive? Who would defend her? Are the nation's political and business leaders patriotic, loyal, courageous and willing enough to risk their lives, their fortunes and their honor for Ukraine?
My July, 2003 article ended as follows:
"Will someone clarify my dismal vision? Say it isn't so. Explain where I am off base. Help."
So this article now ends as well.
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