As the Ukrainian Observer went to press, it was unclear whether the Orange Revolution would successfully morph itself into the Orange coalition - for a second time - and take on at least the appearance of being a government.
In reality it seemed to matter little since the scenes played out in the parliament over recent days strongly suggest that no matter who wears the hats of prime minister and speaker of the parliament, there will be barricades around the speaker's rostrum - and general chaos for many months to come.
With a president who sometimes seems hardly to exist and many other major political players spending great amounts of time grasping for power and positioning themselves for the next presidential race, one can hardly imagine any serious and stable use of presidential, administrative and parliamentary powers in the near future.
The situation has degenerated to the point that it is possible-and likely-that the president will soon have the necessary legal grounds for dismissing the parliament, based on its failure to establish a working majority, and ordering new parliamentary elections. However, that seems to matter little since neither President Viktor Yushchenko nor any of the other major political players has any stomach for a chaotic - and expensive - second set of parliamentary elections this year.
The June 22 press conference, announcing the establishment of the new Orange coalition, did little to dispel doubts about its stability when the parties to the coalition immediately after the press conference began expressing questions about exactly what was included in the package.
  
As might have been expected, the Blue forces of the Party of the Regions took considerable umbrage at being denied any parliamentary committee chairs and resorted to one of the oldest legislative tools of Ukraine, by blocking the parliament speaker's rostrum with its small army of Blue deputies. Since almost every important committee chair had been ceded to control of the largest Orange faction, the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc (BYuT), it was hard to see how they would be willing to give up their hard-won gains. As always, there was the customary, intensive backroom bargaining - but no tangible evidence that a mutually acceptable compromise was forthcoming.
According to the coalition's founding principles the party that received the largest number of seats in the parliament would be entitled to nominate the prime minister, the second largest membership would nominate the speaker of the parliament and the third would be allowed to nominate a vice prime minister.
From the beginning, this arrangement came under attack based on the premise that Our Ukraine, already with its titular head as president of the country, should not be allowed to also name the speaker of parliament. Tymoshenko agreed with the Socialists, that the speakership should go to the Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU), which in practical terms would have ensured that former speaker and SPU leader, Oleksandr Moroz, would be elected to a second, non-consecutive term as speaker.
Our Ukraine balked at these notions and used strongly hints of a Grand Coalition with the Blue forces to beat down the BUTY-SPU move.
When the final list apportioning power positions was announced, BYuT had been allotted the post of prime minister (obviously the plum position so greatly desired by faction head Tymoshenko) and would be allowed to name the ministers of the following ministries: Agro-Industrial Complex; Building and Architecture; Economics; Finance; Fuel and Energy; Coal Industry; Emergencies; Health; Culture & Tourism, as well as the head of the national energy giant - Naftogaz Ukrainy.
Our Ukraine, the second coalition partner, would be allowed to name the speaker of the parliament (most likely Petro Poroshenko, but Anatoliy Kinakh and Yuriy Yekhanurov are said to be on the short list), the vice prime minister for administrative reform (which failed under Our Ukraine’s Roman Bezsmertniy in 2005), plus the ministers of Labor and Social Policy; Industrial Policy; Family; Youth and Sports; and Internal Affairs.
The Socialists would name the first vice speaker (expected to be Iosif Vinsky, the right hand of SPU leader Moroz) and the ministers of Environmental Protection; Education & Science; and Transport & Communications.
In previous times, the sitting president had always been allowed to name all heads of the so-called force ministries - covering just about anyone in Ukraine legally empowered to carry a gun - but as part of the truncation of presidential powers, under constitutional reform, current and future presidents would name only the ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense.
Judging by the triumphal speech given by Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk, immediately after the signing of the coalition agreement, Tarasyuk clearly believes he will be retained in his current position. However, there is very wide consensus that Tarasyuk's removal will be one of the main demands by the Russians, before they are willing to enter meaningful negotiations on a new natural gas contract. Keeping Tarasyuk in his current position would be very unwise and ultimately too high a price to pay. One observer, speaking on the condition of anonymity, told the Ukrainian Observer that "...if Tarasyuk stays as Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Russians will feel nothing has changed." A former very high-level Kuchma administration official, highly regarded in both Moscow and Washington, is thought to be the most likely Tarasyuk replacement.
Even if Regions suffers an immediate tactical loss with the approval of the Orange coalition agreement, the most fervent Orange partisans are skeptical as to the coalition's hold on power. Most analysts give the Tymoshenko government just a few months of life, although a few of the most optimistic believe it could last a year or longer.
Taras Chornovil, a Regions faction leader, chose to be very specific in his views of Orange coalition longevity. "This circus show will be repeated in autumn, when the president will start telling everyone that everything is too bad in Ukraine," Chornovil said, referring to last September's events with the previous Tymoshenko government. In 2005, Tymoshenko was at the helm of the government for seven and one-half months. The smart political money is betting that her tenure this time might be even shorter.
For Tymoshenko, the return to dealing with government problems will be like meeting a group of old friends. There has been little or no progress on many of the issues and problems that were paramount when Tymoshenko was initially ousted.
Geopolitical Positioning
Since the president, in collaboration with the foreign ministry, determines foreign policy, Ukraine's course toward European and Euro-Atlantic integration will remain unchanged, as agreed in the founding charter of the Orange coalition.
The generally accepted premise that Ukraine would use a relatively easy NATO accession as a way station on the road to full European Union membership was severely dented and perhaps even permanently damaged by the violent and persistent anti-NATO protests in Crimea this past May. The enormity of the anti-NATO reaction pointed out an increasingly obvious fact, i.e. that talk in the halls of power about NATO accession had almost no support in the form of a seriously intensive, widespread and effective pro-NATO information campaign. Suddenly, the top levels of government in Kyiv, Brussels, London and Washington understood that they had not just dropped the ball, but they didn't even know where the ball was or how to play it. Whether or not this miscalculation can be overcome in the near future is very much in doubt.
Russia, a geopolitical actor that cannot be ignored, is keen to see the first steps taken by the new government. Aggressive and provocative behavior of some Russian politicians is just the tip of the Russian iceberg, with even more ominous and dangerous rumblings below the surface.
Presidents Yushchenko and Putin once described relations between Kyiv and Moscow as pragmatic, but this term was misunderstood by both Russian and Ukrainian political players. Moscow is waiting for a signal promising mutual benefits from economic cooperation.
A point listed in the Orange coalition agreement could articulate one such signal. Notably, Ukraine's cooperation with the Common Economic Space - the Russia dominated economic bloc whose members include Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. The neo-Orange coalition will insist on a free trade area, with the other conditions set by Russia negotiated on a case-by-case basis, based on Ukraine's national interests.
Energy - tops on everyone's priority list
"The first 'must be done' is fighting the chaos in the energy system, and fighting the chaos in energy price making and prices for communal services," said Tymoshenko in detailing her priorities. Tymoshenko said her first move as prime minister would be reviewing the price paid by Ukraine for Russian natural gas.
Tymoshenko's new government is fortunate to be getting launched in the summer, perhaps providing a less stressful re-entry period before fall brings intense political heat and a possible collision course with the Regions Party. Ukraine is believed to have adequate petrol to make it through the harvest season, but should the looming energy battle not get resolved before the beginning of the winter heating season in mid-October, a natural gas problem could quickly become a national and international disaster of major proportions, possibly even dwarfing the cutoffs of Russian natural gas to Europe last winter.
Many observers believe that appointing an energy negotiator that is a Regions' stalwart would be a smart and prudent move. Moscow still has problems with Tymoshenko, hates Tarasyuk and hopes to have seen the last of the western Ukrainian nationalist who negotiated the last agreement.
Russian Duma deputy Konstantin Zatulin said that the gas agreements are the subject of a compromise between the two countries. "If Ms. Tymoshenko wants to review them, it will be necessary to have a mutual desire, including that of the Russian party," Zatulin said recently. Russian political expert Sergey Markov of the Institute for Political Research said he is sure that Tymoshenko's idea of reviewing natural gas prices could lead to a prolonged impasse on the issue, and could seriously affect gas supplies to Europe.
Saying the right words
In the new Tymoshenko government (assuming it actually gets a narrow margin of victory in the parliament) certain words appear likely to be erased from the Tymoshenko lexicon. The word so oft-heard during the previous Tymoshenko government, "reprivatization," tops the list of words that all her coalition partners hope to hear less of this time round. While no one doubts that many suspicious privatizations - and some that were blatantly corrupt - occurred in the ten years prior to the Yushchenko presidency, the costs of righting old wrongs has already proven to be extremely divisive. Windfalls of the type that came with the reprivatization of the Kryvorizhstal steel mill are almost certainly a thing of the past.
The list of problems requiring the government's intense attention is a very long and expensive one. With higher natural gas prices will come an inevitable drain on both public and private resources. This summer of discontent may soon be remembered with fondness and nostalgia.
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After three months of sometimes open but mostly behind the curtain negotiations, what passes for political leadership in Ukraine appears ready to continue quarreling over even the smallest seats of power while larger issues go untended and unmitigated.
