Politicians have a bad reputation among the Ukrainian population.
The popular image of a politician seems to be a shady character who doesn't hesitate to change his/her opinion and faction, be it for a bribe or an office, who lets other people vote instead of being present in the parliament him/herself, or votes instead of other members of parliament who are not present. According to a recent poll, an overwhelming 73 percent of the Ukrainian population believes that the majority of MPs are ready to betray voters for money or position.
Few people are aware however that several habits of Ukrainian MPs are or have been habits of MPs of other countries. We'll focus here on two such habits, the practice of switching factions and the practice of voting for absent MPs.
There does not seem much academic literature on this, but a quick search in Google shows a lot of examples of MPs voting on behalf of absent MPs in parliaments all over the world.
The following quote from a 1975 issue of Time Magazine is very illustrative of the fact that Ukrainian politicians are not that unique: "The people of Illinois have been treated in recent weeks to the spectacle of their state lawmakers engaging in their annual rite of spring: making 'goddamn fools' of themselves, in the apt words of one representative, as they rush to complete the legislative agenda before the adjournment scheduled for June 30. Since some 4,500 measures had been introduced, legislators were forced to meet nights and weekends. As tempers flared, medics outside the chambers tested blood pressure, and sent two people to the hospital. In the pell-mell push, the house passed five bills by votes of more than 130 to 0, although only about 30 of the 176 members were present. As the roll was called, legislators scampered about the floor to vote for absent colleagues."
In Italy, MPs voting instead of others are said to 'play the piano', pushing the voting buttons of several MPs. In 2002, the pro government majority pushed through the Italian Senate a controversial bill on judicial reform (which was designed to protect the then-serving Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi). At least two dozens senators were caught on video pressing electronic voting buttons that belonged to absent colleagues in order to avoid failing to reach a quorum.
In Switzerland, introducing a countermeasure - a second button under the voting desk - solved this issue. MPs use one hand to press the yes/no button, and their other hand to press a second button.
In some countries, there is a legal procedure to vote on behalf of absent MPs. In the New Zealand Parliament, proxy voting is possible. An MP may give authority for a proxy vote to be cast during her/his absence. A proxy must contain the name of the MP who is giving the authority, the date it is given and the period for which the authority is valid, and indicate the member who is given authority to exercise it.
The problem of voting instead of absent MPs may also be solved as it is done in Canada, where pairing is possible. Pairing is an agreement between two MPs from different parties of the House of Commons to abstain from voting on a particular occasion, permitting them to be absent. Their votes are effectively neutralized and the relative strength of their parties remains the same. A similar procedure has long been in use in the U. S. House of Representatives.
In general the problem of voting on behalf of absent colleagues arises in parliaments that use electronic voting systems that technically leave space for cheating. In many legislative bodies around the world there are procedures of personal voting by means of simple physical separation and grouping of deputies according to their votes: yes, no or abstain. Thus, only present MPs may vote and has only one vote. In the German Bundestag MPs have a somewhat cumbersome procedure of voting by going through voting doors. For each option yes/no/abstain there is a door: MPs vote by going through the chosen door and a person near each door writes down the names of those who passed through it.
Another habit of Ukrainian politicians that is generally regarded in a negative light is that of party or faction switching. MPs may decide to switch for several reasons. First, they might want to be re-elected so they might prefer to join parties with good electoral prospects. Second, legislators may switch parties when their ideological preferences differ too much from those of their own party. Third, switchers may join governing parties in search for national and local perks - or may simply be bribed to do so.
According to data for 1998-2002 and 2002-2006 (3rd and 4th convocation of Verkhovna Rada respectively) about 60 percent of MPs changed their factional affiliation at least once. That is, three out of every five MPs switched faction in the Ukrainian Parliament. There were some MPs that changed their faction as many as 10 times.
In the United States switching happens too - just check the Wikipedia on Party Switching. It gives a long list of switchers, including Democrats becoming Republicans and vice versa. During 163-year period there were 38 Senators and 160 House members that switched parties. In the European Parliament, 13 percent of MPs switched during the 1989-1994 convocation.
In the Brazilian parliament, one-third of deputies typically change parties during a four-year term; some of them change party as many as seven times. Almost one-fourth of the members of the lower house in Italy, the Chamber of Deputies, switched parties at least once between 1996 and 2001. In the Russian State Duma, during its 1993-95 convocation 31 percent of MPs switched. And two out of every five Members of the Czech Parliament switched parties during the period 1992-1996.
Legislators will switch party as long as the benefits of switching outweigh the possible costs. The costs of switching may be determined by laws or imposed by informal institutions. For example, some countries solve the issue of switching by introducing the institute of imperative mandate, according to which the mandate primarily belongs to a party, not to a person elected through a party list. Thus, any defector is stripped of her/his mandate. This practice is used in such countries as Russia, Cuba, China, North Korea, Vietnam, India, the South African Republic, Nigeria and Vanuatu.
On the contrary, some European countries like Belgium, Germany, Italy, Finland, and France assume that the imperative mandate constrains people's choice of representatives, so they banned it by their national constitutions.
Voters may also punish switchers. If the electorate is active in monitoring the activity of elected MPs, party defectors could lose their reputation and support in the next re-election campaign. For example, scholars found that in both the Czech Republic and Poland during 1990-1997 years, MPs' re-election prospects were greater in cases when they stayed with their parties, and some types of party-switching proved to be very costly to candidates.
From the above, it's clear that the problems of Ukrainian politics are not unique. Similar problems are and have been observed elsewhere. What is also clear is that the right set of electoral rules and an attentive electorate that punishes "bad" behavior may go a long way toward making MPs behave well.
Tom Coupe, is Director of the Kyiv School of Economics and Kyiv Economics Institute. Ivan Yuryk is a research associate of the Kyiv School of Economics. The views expressed in this article are the authors' views, not the views of the institutions with which they are affiliated.
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